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Proportionality and Employment  
Discrimination in the UK 
 
By Aaron Baker

 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper argues that the justification defence in UK statutory indirect 
discrimination cases should incorporate proportionality as applied by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  It first analyses the evolution of the 
UK approach to proportionality before the enactment of the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA), when its primary influence was the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) applying EC equal treatment directives.  This assessment 
shows that the UK judiciary was already adopting an approach to proportionality 
at odds with that of the ECJ, and more resonant with that of the ECtHR.  An 
evaluation of UK practice, however, including consideration of GMB v Allen, 
shows that UK judges do not apply the rigorous scrutiny required by either the 
ECJ or ECtHR approaches.  The article considers the doctrine of proportionality 
as developed through the discrimination jurisprudence of the ECtHR, and its 
application under the HRA.  Given the increasing relevance of ECHR precedent 
under the HRA, the article evaluates how the influence of Strasbourg teaching 
can (and should) enhance the UK approach to the resolution of employment 
discrimination claims. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Proportionality plays an increasing role in employment anti-discrimination law in the 
UK, in great part as a result of the directives based on Article 13 of the EC Treaty.
1
  
Those directives have led to the adoption of measures prohibiting employment 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, religion or belief, and age, as well as 
to the amendment of existing statutory protections based on race, gender, and disability.  
These EC-driven provisions have incorporated ‘genuine occupational requirement’ 
(GOR) and justification defences that turn ultimately on a proportionality test.
2
  At about 
                                                 

 Senior Lecturer in Law, Durham University, United Kingdom; admitted to practice in Illinois, Missouri, 
and before the U.S. Federal Courts.  I would like to thank the United Kingdom Arts and Humanities 
Research Council for its support, in the form of a research leave grant, of the preparation of this article.  
1
 Council Directive No. 76/207 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, etc (as amended by Directive 2002/73); Council Directive No. 
2000/43 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin; Council Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation. 
2
 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 1(2)(b); Race Relations Act 1976 ss 1(1A) & 4A(2); Employment Equality 
(Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 ss 3(1)(b) & 7(2); Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003 ss 3(1)(b) & 7(2); Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 ss 3(1)(b) & 8(2). 
 2 
the same time, the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), by applying European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) protections in UK law, has made proportionality a common 
doctrine in UK courts, where it had previously been a relative stranger.  This means that 
the measures implementing the Article 13 EC directives are finding their feet at a time 
when UK judges are just beginning to get their hands dirty with the mechanics of the 
proportionality doctrine.  This period of invention-by-necessity, fuelled by the usually 
extensive amount of anti-discrimination litigation in the UK, has confronted judges and 
tribunal chairs with a steep learning curve over the application of proportionality in 
employment discrimination law.   
There remains a great deal for them to learn.  This article analyses the evolution 
of the UK approach to proportionality before the enactment of the HRA, when its 
primary influence was the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) applying 
EC equal treatment directives.  This assessment shows that the UK judiciary was already 
adopting an approach to proportionality at odds with that of the ECJ, and more resonant 
with that of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  The article then considers 
the doctrine of proportionality as developed through the discrimination jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR, and its application under the HRA.  Given that section 3 of the HRA can 
require that domestic anti-discrimination laws be interpreted consistently with ECHR 
rights and freedoms, the paper argues that the Strasbourg teaching can (and should) 
enhance the UK approach to the resolution of employment discrimination claims.   
 
Proportionality in UK and EC Employment Discrimination Law 
 
Proportionality is a concept that has been well developed in Europe, but incorporated in 
U.K. adjudication only grudgingly, and often because European obligations required it.
3
  
Although British courts have flirted with proportionality in their judicial review 
jurisprudence,
4
 the primary role of proportionality outside the ECHR and the HRA has 
been in areas heavily influenced by European Community law, such as indirect 
discrimination.
5
  Indirect discrimination involves a claim, for example under the Race 
Relations Act 1976 (RRA), that a facially neutral rule (‘a provision, criterion, or 
practice’) imposes greater burdens (‘a particular disadvantage’) on persons of the 
claimant’s race than on other people.  Proportionality comes into play because the RRA 
and similar statutes allow defendants to ‘justify’ indirect discrimination by way of a form 
of proportionality defence.  The defence typically requires that the employer’s aim be 
legitimate, and the means to achieve it proportionate.
6
  This of course begs the question 
of under what circumstances a rule or policy represents a proportionate means to a 
legitimate aim.  
The justification defence existed in domestic law even before ECJ interpretations 
of EC Article 141—the provision that guaranteed equal pay between men and women 
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well before the Article 13 directives came onto the scene—began to shape the UK 
jurisprudence.  As early as the 1970s disagreements had arisen over whether, under the 
RRA and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA), justification required that the 
employer show the ‘necessity’ of the indirectly discriminatory rule.  In an early SDA case 
the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) insisted that justification could only be claimed 
by ‘the need, not the convenience, of the business.’7  By 1980, however, the Court of 
Appeal in an RRA case saw no need to consider the availability to the employer of less 
discriminatory rules in holding that a ban on beards was justified on grounds of hygiene, 
even where the rule appeared to allow other facial hair besides beards.
8
  Not long after, 
the Court of Appeal in Ojutiku v Manpower Services Commission made its position 
clearer by saying that justification ‘clearly applies a lower standard than the word 
“necessary,”’ and concluding that justification only requires reasons ‘which would be 
acceptable to right-thinking people as sound and tolerable reasons.’9 
Judges resisted the word ‘necessary’ because it implied that the indirectly 
discriminatory rule or policy was the only way the employer could achieve a legitimate 
aim.  If an employer can achieve its legitimate objective with a rule that has less of a 
discriminatory impact than the rule under challenge, then the latter can hardly be called 
‘necessary.’  The UK courts in the first decade of the SDA and RRA clearly did not want 
to apply such a ‘least restrictive means’ test to employers.  However, this position came 
under pressure when, in the Bilka-Kaufhaus case, the ECJ ruled that indirect 
discrimination under Article 141 EC could satisfy the justification defence only where it 
‘correspond[s] to a real need on the part of the undertaking’ and is ‘necessary.’10  At the 
time, this decision was binding as to the Equal Pay Act 1970 (EqPA), which made it 
presumptively applicable to the SDA, but not necessarily the RRA.
11
  Because the 
Ojutiku approach was ‘of little help’ in the face of the Bilka guidance, the Court of 
Appeal in Hampson v Department of Education and Science had to find a way to 
reconcile avoidance of a ‘least restrictive means’ test with the ECJ’s enshrinement of the 
word ‘necessary.’12 
Although Hampson was subsequently overruled by the House of Lords on other 
grounds, where the Lords eschewed the justification issue altogether, the ratio of the 
Court of Appeal was later expressly approved by the House of Lords in Webb v EMO.
13
  
In Hampson the court held that justification under the RRA ‘requires an objective balance 
between the discriminatory effect of the condition and the reasonable needs of the party 
who applies the condition.’14  On its face this kind of test should have made it possible 
for particularly strong discriminatory effects to outweigh even ‘necessary’ rules or 
policies (this implication receives more attention below).  However, the court in 
Hampson almost certainly had a different side of the equation in mind.  The balancing 
approach would allow judges to apply a test not blatantly inconsistent with Bilka’s ‘real 
need’ and ‘necessary’ language—because it appeared to define ‘necessary’ as meaning 
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‘when reasonable needs outweigh discriminatory effect’—while avoiding a least 
restrictive means test.  Balancing enabled a court or tribunal to find some variable in the 
case, such as legitimate aim or discriminatory effect, of a sufficiently high or low weight 
to excuse it from exploring whether there were less restrictive means available to the 
discriminator.   
Hampson illustrates how UK courts reached for a flexible approach when the 
more structured ECJ approach required them rigorously to second-guess the means by 
which employers pursued their objectives.  How the UK judiciary responded to Enderby 
v Frenchay Health Authority offers another demonstration of how keen courts were to 
avoid getting pinned down by the clarity of a least restrictive means test.
15
  The ECJ in 
Enderby rejected the EAT’s approach to justification in an EqPA case—the EAT had 
found an entire pay differential justified, but only a proportion of the differential was 
actually necessitated by market forces—because it allowed some discriminatory impact 
that could have been avoided, and was not therefore shown to be necessary.  In short, the 
result reiterated that ‘necessary’ meant that no justification would succeed where a less 
discriminatory alternative was available.   In reaching this result, the ECJ reminded the 
UK courts that they must apply the principle of proportionality in UK law.  It was this 
reminder that Lord Nicholls, in the leading House of Lords speech in Barry v Midland 
Bank, relied on to claim that Enderby stood for the following proposition: 
 
[T]he ground relied upon as justification must be of sufficient importance for the 
national court to regard this as overriding the disparate impact of the difference in 
treatment, either in whole or in part.  The more serious the disparate impact on 
women or men, as the case may be, the more cogent must be the objective 
justification.
16
 
 
Lord Nicholls went on to opine that once the employer’s objective had been found 
‘legitimate,’ the policy in question was justified so long as it was needed to achieve the 
objective: he expressly rejected the idea that a policy could be challenged on the ground 
that the aim it served did not correspond to the needs, as opposed to the convenience, of 
the business.
17
  This contradicted the clear statement in Bilka that only a measure 
necessary to meet a real need of the employer can outweigh a discriminatory impact.   
To understand what the Lords did in Barry requires an appreciation of the variety 
of ways in which the principle of proportionality can be expressed.  Proportionality 
comes to European jurisprudence through German law, which developed a doctrine of 
proportionality requiring that state acts or measures be (1) suitable to achieve a legitimate 
purpose, (2) necessary to achieve that purpose, and (3) proportional in the narrower 
sense: they must not impose burdens or ‘cause harms to other legitimate interests’ that 
outweigh the objectives achieved.
18
  ‘Proportionality in the narrower sense’ 
(proportionality stricto sensu), became the foundation of the Article 14 ECHR analysis in 
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the Belgian Linguistics case, which was in fact the first mention of the doctrine of 
proportionality by the ECtHR.
19
  This basic European principle of proportionality 
requires that invasions of a right impose no greater restrictions on the right (or on ‘rights 
interests’) than can be balanced out by the need of the state to invade the right; the state’s 
‘need’ refers not only to the importance of the objective but to the ‘need’ for the 
particular means employed to achieve it.  This principle constitutes proportionality in its 
‘strict sense,’ while more complicated formulations are essentially structured analyses 
intended to ensure the observation of the principle.    
Proportionality stricto sensu is also included in the ECJ understanding of 
justification of indirect discrimination, but is far less emphasised owing to Bilka’s 
adoption of a structured analysis involving ‘real need’ and necessity.20  Such a test rests 
on a presumption that a discriminatory impact has substantial ‘weight’ in the balancing 
exercise.  A justification cannot outweigh this impact unless at least (a) the business has a 
real need to achieve a particular aim, and (b) the measure it employs to achieve it is 
necessary, in the sense of representing the least restrictive alternative.  Nothing in Bilka 
suggests that the test deprives a court of the option of finding that a measure which meets 
those criteria nevertheless fails to satisfy proportionality stricto sensu.  Since 1997, after 
Bilka, Council Directive 97/80/EC on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination 
based on sex (among other directives) has specified that indirect discrimination can be 
justified only where a challenged rule is ‘appropriate and necessary.’  This illustrates yet 
another mode of expressing the principle of proportionality.  Subsequent ECJ decisions 
have made it clear that this facially less demanding language must be applied consistently 
with the Bilka requirements.
21
  Thus the ECJ approach to proportionality, at least with 
regard to the justification of indirect discrimination, guarantees proportionality stricto 
sensu by requiring a level of scrutiny that goes beyond striking an ad hoc balance, in 
effect giving discriminatory impact a presumptively high weight by approving as justified 
only means necessary to meet a real need of the business.   
In that light, Lord Nicholls’s speech in Barry shows a lot of cheek.  Enderby 
treated the failure to employ the ‘least restrictive alternative’ in the case before it as 
precluding a finding of proportionality, and then reminded courts to apply 
proportionality.  The House of Lords responded by (1) extracting the little-relied-on 
balancing part of the ECJ conception to (2) justify ignoring the far more demanding tests 
imposed in Bilka (including least restrictive alternative) and (3) failing to replace the 
Bilka presumptions with a proper stricto sensu analysis assigning a meaningful weight to 
discriminatory impacts.  As a result, at least as late as Barry (decided just before the HRA 
came into effect) the UK judiciary embraced the idea of balancing impacts against 
justifications as a poor substitute for—and perhaps as a means of distracting observers 
from the subversion of—the real need and necessity standards required by the ECJ.22  
                                                 
19
 Belgian Linguistics (1968) 1 EHRR 252, para 10; M.-A. Eissen, ‘The Principle of Proportionality in the 
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights,’ in The European System for the Protection of Human 
Rights (R St J Macdonald, F Matscher & H Petzold eds, 1993), 140. 
20
 Cadman v Health and Safety Executive [2006] ICR 1623, 1635-1639, 1647 (the ECJ referred specifically 
to the paragraph of Bilka which required that the policy correspond to a ‘real need’ of the business).  
21
 See, eg, ibid. 
22
 It is acknowledged that recent cases suggest that the ECJ itself does not always strictly adhere to the idea 
that a legitimate aim must correspond to a real need of the employer, but the point here is to observe how 
UK cases have skirted the issue.   
 6 
 
UK Proportionality in Practice 
 
The sad irony of the foregoing stems from the fact that discrimination claimants in the 
UK never get the part of proportionality that might compensate them for the loss of the 
necessity test.  Proportionality stricto sensu should mean that very weighty impacts might 
override even a rule or policy found necessary to achieve a legitimate aim.  However, UK 
judges have consistently treated proportionality balancing as if it means only that if the 
employer can point to strong enough reasons, even an ‘unnecessary’ rule can be justified, 
but never the other way around.  It is nearly impossible to find a UK employment 
discrimination decision where the impact of the discrimination is measured or weighed at 
all.  A good illustration comes from the post-Bilka case of Board of Governors of St 
Matthias Church v Crizzle, where the EAT (Wood, J.) found indirect discrimination 
against an applicant for a head teacher position justified on the facts.
23
   
The School had advertised a head teacher post with the requirement that the 
applicant be a ‘communicant’ in the Church of England or the Catholic Church, so that he 
or she could lead the morning assemblies in prayer.  The claimant, an Asian woman who 
was not a communicant but was otherwise a well-qualified member of the Church, 
demonstrated that a much smaller proportion of Asians could satisfy the communicant 
requirement than could whites.  The EAT set out the following test, the satisfaction of 
which would allow the School to justify the indirect discrimination: 
(a) Was the objective of the governors a legitimate objective (it is not for the 
Industrial Tribunal to redraft or redefine the objective)? In the present case it was 
to have a headteacher who could lead the school in spiritual worship and in 
particular the administering of the sacrament at the weekly mass to those who 
were confirmed. The headteacher should have full membership of the Church in 
order to foster the Anglo-Catholic ethos of the school. 
(b) Were the means used to achieve the objective reasonable in themselves? and 
(c) When balanced on the principles of proportionality between the discriminatory 
effect upon the applicant's racial group and the reasonable needs of the governors, 
were they justified?
24
 
 
In response to the complaint that the school had defined its ‘legitimate objective’ in such 
a way that the objective differed in no meaningful way from the means adopted to meet 
it, the tribunal below had found that the ‘legitimate objective’ should have been that of 
blending an ‘Anglo-Catholic ethos’ with efficient education (an objective for which one 
might say the school had a ‘real need’), and that therefore the means (requiring a 
communicant head teacher) was a mere preference and hence not reasonable.
25
  The EAT 
rejected this finding, and based its entire justification analysis on assessing the extent to 
which the rule in question suited the schools own statement of its aims.  Naturally, once 
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the school’s preference for a prayer-leading head teacher was accepted as ‘legitimate’ the 
requirement of a prayer-leading qualification was found reasonable.  Not a word was 
written on the subject of the impact of the discrimination on the claimant, or upon the 
local Asian community, or upon relations between whites and Asians in the local 
community.  In other words, the tribunal treated the ‘discriminatory effect’ from element 
(c) as if it had an assumed—and fairly minimal—weight.  The EAT opinion left the 
impression that although indirect discrimination was bad, the weight of its badness could 
never be great enough to outweigh a legitimate objective, reasonably pursued. 
 Under this kind of analysis the cards could not be more relentlessly stacked 
against the claimant.  The employer need not satisfy Bilka’s necessity requirement, so the 
justification succeeds regardless of the availability of less discriminatory means.  Of 
course, the availability of less restrictive means is merely hypothetical, because the 
employer also faces no ‘real need’ requirement, so is free to define its objective as more 
or less identical with the criterion it seeks to apply, without showing a real need for it.  
Thus in Crizzle the school avoided having to defend its decision that the interests of the 
students and the ethos of the school could not be served by any other means than by the 
head teacher—nobody else would do—leading the school in prayer.  Once the tribunal 
accepted this as ‘legitimate,’ the game was over, because the objective could only 
possibly be achieved by requiring that the head teacher have the credentials prerequisite 
to performing that function.  The Crizzle analysis could redeem itself, however, through 
proportionality stricto sensu.  A proper balancing might find that the absence of a real 
need for the particular policy adopted would place a very low weight on the employer’s 
side of the balance, enabling evidence of the discriminatory effects of the policy, on the 
students, the claimant, and the community, to outweigh the justification.  Alas, that part 
of the analysis was mere chimera.     
 Crizzle-style curtailed proportionality typifies UK justification inquiries in 
indirect discrimination cases.  There was a brief ray of hope, however, in the Court of 
Appeal decision in Allonby v Accrington and Rossingdale College.
26
  In this case, 
decided, interestingly, on the heels of the coming into force of the HRA, the court noted 
that Barry was not the only authority on the application of proportionality. Following 
ECJ guidance Allonby held that the decision of the tribunal below, that ‘sound business 
reasons’ amounted to a justification, could not stand.  The court held that justification 
required ‘a critical evaluation of whether the [employer’s] reasons demonstrated a real 
need . . . ; if there was such a need, consideration of the seriousness of the disparate 
impact . . . on women including the applicant; and an evaluation of whether the former 
were sufficient to outweigh the latter.’27  Note that now ‘real need’ has been reinstated, 
but there is no requirement that the challenged rule be necessary to meet that need.  The 
result is a more effective formulation than in Crizzle, but not one that brings the UK 
justification analysis in line with that of the ECJ. 
The best part of the Allonby formulation is its reference to weighing the disparate 
impact against the employer’s need.  This properly draws attention to the effects of 
discrimination, and appears to offer claimants at least one of the benefits of 
proportionality in partial compensation for their loss of the necessity requirement.  
However, Allonby’s admirable expression of proportionality stricto sensu was not, 
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unfortunately, accompanied by any guidance on how impacts are to be weighed.  
Moreover, its mode of expression—‘whether the former [the employer’s need] were 
sufficient to outweigh the latter [discriminatory impact]’—reinforces the assumption that 
‘outweighing’ only goes in one direction.  Probably as a result, cases since Allonby 
generally involve no more weighing of impacts than Crizzle.  
 A stark example of this phenomenon is GMB v Allen.
28
  That case involved a 
situation where a planned job evaluation scheme would demonstrate that several women 
workers had been underpaid for years, and several other employees, mostly men, had 
been overpaid. In other words, some women would wind up reclassified upward, and 
have EqPA claims for past underpayment, while several men (a much greater proportion 
of the GMB union’s membership) would be reclassified down, and face pay cuts.  The 
GMB pressured female union members to take risible settlements of their equal pay 
claims, in order to leave the employer enough money to grant better concessions to 
protect the pay of those reclassified downward.  The Employment Tribunal (ET) found 
the union’s bargaining policy indirectly discriminatory against women, and applied a 
justification test that called for the policy to pursue a legitimate aim through 
proportionate means.
29
  Because it did not follow the Bilka or Allonby requirements of a 
‘real need’ for the challenged policy, the ET found the aim of the policy—‘to avoid or 
minimise “losers”’ in the pay reclassification—legitimate.  Nevertheless the ET found 
that the means—failing to push the equal pay claims harder and using ‘spin’ to get 
women to agree to the settlements—were not proportionate.  This conclusion did not rest 
on a weighing of the impacts of the union’s bargaining conduct, but on the assumption 
that it could never be proportionate for the union ‘to procure the acceptance or 
acquiescence of [the women with EqPA claims] by a marked economy of truth in what it 
says and writes to them.’30 
On appeal the EAT found the discrimination justified, and did not replace the 
ET’s ‘legitimate aim’ test either with a ‘real need’ requirement or the weighing of 
impacts called for by proportionality stricto sensu.  There are too many things wrong 
with this decision to mention them all here.  For the purposes of this paper it suffices to 
discuss the EAT’s reliance on Barry (not Allonby) for the proposition that once the aim 
has been accepted as legitimate, then any means necessary to meet that end are justified.
31
 
We must leave aside for another paper whether it could ever be a legitimate objective 
intentionally to favour, in collective bargaining, the interests of mostly male reclassified 
employees over the interests of exclusively, and not accidentally, female employees with 
EqPA claims: the tribunal below had conceded the legitimacy of this aim as an issue of 
fact.  This finding ignored, of course, the commands of both Bilka and Allonby that the 
respondent show a ‘real need,’ not merely a ‘legitimate aim.’  The EAT could hardly fail 
to have reached a different result had GMB been required to prove a real need for its 
discriminatory bargaining position.  With only a legitimate aim to worry about, the EAT 
suddenly did not so much mind using the necessity test that UK judges usually resist.  It 
held that the objective at issue could only be achieved through the means employed: 
pressuring—even by unlawful or deceitful means—women union members to sacrifice 
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 9 
their claims.  At no point did the EAT even mention, much less weigh or balance, the 
impact of such a collective bargaining policy on the women claimants, on women in the 
union other than the claimants, or on gender equality in the workplace.    
Although the Court of Appeal subsequently rejected the EAT ruling and 
reinstated that of the ET, no effort was made to correct or strengthen the analysis used.
32
  
The opinion observed that the EAT incorrectly discounted the ET’s finding, that the 
union’s use of ‘spin’ amounted to a disproportionate means, because the EAT assumed 
that this conduct was not really a part of the relevant means.
33
  This very technical 
decision corrects one crucial transgression of the EAT—the suggestion that any means 
necessary to a legitimate aim is proportionate.  However, it appears to go no further than 
to say that a tribunal may find that employing dishonesty as a means to a legitimate aim 
is disproportionate.  It leaves in place a test that (1) does not require a ‘real need’ for the 
discriminatory policy and (2) fails to acknowledge that not all ‘legitimate aims’ are 
created equal.  Because the proportionality analysis that remains does not involve a step 
where impacts are weighed, then weak aims like that of the union can still pass muster as 
long as the aim cannot be realised through less discriminatory means, and the means do 
not involve outright dishonesty.   
 One telling implication of this case is that while UK judges embrace balancing in 
order to avoid being required to apply a necessity test, when the facts appear to indicate 
that the means were necessary, balancing goes out the window.  It is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the domestic judiciary’s discomfort with second-guessing lawmakers and 
decision makers leads it to shut its eyes to impacts.  Although it flouted Allonby, the EAT 
decision in Allen did not stray far from the spirit of Ojutiku, Hampson, Barry, and Crizzle 
in finding that even the clearly egregious impacts of the devious union behaviour could 
never actually outweigh a necessary means to a legitimate aim.  This is true even though 
one gets the impression the EAT were holding their collective noses while treating the 
union’s aim as ‘legitimate.’34 Proportionality is in a parlous state indeed if a barely 
legitimate aim, unlawfully and deceitfully pursued, is not even considered a candidate for 
being outweighed by obviously unfair discriminatory impacts and the reinforcement of 
long-term discrimination by an employer. 
 
The Influence of the HRA 
 
The introduction of Article 14 ECHR into UK courts through the HRA, however, should 
in theory have improved the environment for receptivity to a proper proportionality 
balancing. By its terms the HRA openly embraces the part of proportionality from which 
judges traditionally shrink: it asks courts, when necessary, to substitute their judgment for 
that of the original decision maker on the question of compatibility with Convention 
rights.
35
  If the HRA requires courts to engage in a fresh proportionality inquiry to 
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determine whether a state measure violates an ECHR right (in cases involving those 
rights qualified by proportionality), one would expect this to remove much of the 
legitimate ‘judicial restraint’-based resistance to a searching assessment of benefits and 
impacts.  Debate obviously persists over the extent to which judges should defer to 
lawmakers with regard to issues falling within their expertise or majoritarian remit.  
However, there can be no doubt that the HRA has increased the intensity of review 
beyond the Wednesbury standard that applied in pre-HRA judicial review cases.
36
  
Section 6 HRA makes it ‘unlawful for a [court] to act in a way which is incompatible 
with a Convention Right,’ without express authority from Parliament.   This means that 
institutionally the courts have the final word, because they have the last chance to prevent 
Convention-incompatible state actions, and the duty to do so.  
This institutional position as the last bastion of rights enforcement should by itself 
embolden courts to perform an independent assessment of proportionality. However, the 
HRA provides even more explicit direction. Although courts are bound to apply 
Parliamentary statutes, s 3(1) HRA requires judges, ‘so far as it is possible to do so’ to 
read and ‘give effect’ to legislation, regulations, or decisions in a way compatible with 
Convention rights, even where a natural reading of the law would violate the Convention.  
Where a measure cannot be read in a Convention-compatible way without going against 
the manifest intent of Parliament, s 4 HRA requires that the court issue a ‘declaration of 
incompatibility,’ meaning that the court will apply the statute as written, but substantial 
political pressure will exist for Parliament to amend the offending statute (although it is 
not obliged to do so).  Courts are empowered essentially to change the effects of 
measures—amend them from what they would have been upon a natural reading—unless 
the offending effects were consciously intended by Parliament, in which case they are to 
tell Parliament if they think it struck the balance incorrectly.
37
  This means that judges 
have been expressly instructed to make a determination as to whether Article 14 ECHR, 
for example, has been violated, not whether Parliament or an executive decision maker 
reasonably thought they were acting consistently with Article 14.  They can only perform 
this task by engaging in a factual evaluation of the weight of the state interest as balanced 
against the weight of the rights interest.  This leaves no excuse for ‘restraint’ other than in 
matters of deference to expertise or majority policy choice.     
In light of this, the HRA provides a natural and logical opportunity to enhance the 
application of proportionality in domestic anti-discrimination law.  I call this opportunity 
‘natural’ for three reasons.  First, it seems inevitable that judges will begin to view 
proportionality generally in the way that they find themselves so often applying it under 
the HRA, which should translate into increasing confidence with second-guessing 
decision-makers.  Second, as is set out more fully below, the Strasbourg test for 
proportionality under Article 14 sounds much more like the version set out in Hampson 
and Allonby than the necessity tests of Bilka and Enderby, and therefore seems a fitting 
source of guidance in fleshing out the UK understanding.  Third, under the HRA Article 
14 can apply to any statutory discrimination case involving inequality in the enjoyment of 
a Convention right.  That could include, among others, cases involving sexual orientation 
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discrimination (privacy under Article 8), religious discrimination (freedom of religion 
under Article 9) or discrimination by one’s union as in Allen (freedom of association 
under Article 11).  In such cases s 2(1) HRA requires the tribunal to ‘take account of’ the 
ECtHR approach to proportionality, and UK courts have generally been inclined to 
follow Strasbourg precedent in the absence of a compelling reason not to.  In practice, 
this should mean that where Article 14 applies, tribunals will interpret the indirect 
discrimination justification defence consistently with Strasbourg teaching on 
proportionality.   
Of course, the domestic judiciary are perfectly capable of passing up a natural and 
logical opportunity.  They should seize this one, however, because (1) the current 
departure from ECJ authority is not sustainable, (2) moving closer to the Strasbourg 
approach will do less violence to existing domestic precedent and (3) a robust balancing 
(stricto sensu) model should be enough to make an express reconciliation with Bilka 
unnecessary.  As to the first point, even though the EAT decision in GMB v Allen was 
reversed, at the time of writing the GMB union was determined to take the case to the 
House of Lords.
38
 The EAT’s reasoning was not far out of step with the run of UK 
opinions, and Allen will certainly not be the last case in which a job evaluation scheme 
pits equal pay claims against the interests of the core members of a large union.
39
 A 
correction of some kind must occur, leaving only the question whether the UK courts will 
eat humble pie (under the duress of an ECJ judgement or otherwise) or find a more 
graceful way to close the gap.  If they choose to cleave to the Bilka test, they must back-
pedal through a carefully chicaned line of cases.  On the other hand, a move toward the 
ECtHR approach could develop more smoothly from the seed of balancing planted in 
Hampson.  Although Hampson itself does not satisfy ECJ requirements, the Strasbourg 
approach can, because the Bilka test employed a set of presumptions—real need and 
necessity—to assure the satisfaction of proportionality stricto sensu.40 In other words, the 
ECJ is unlikely to view the Bilka test as substantively different from the ECHR 
understanding of proportionality; instead, it is a structured analysis employed to ensure 
the full application of the principle.  Thus, a full and rigorous ECtHR-style approach to 
proportionality should satisfy the ECJ.  UK judges can, and should, bring their 
jurisprudence in line with the European principle of proportionality by following the 
more intuitive and flexible Strasbourg teaching. 
 
Strasbourg on Article 14 Justification 
 
Article 14 reads, in total: 
 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
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religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status. 
 
Demonstrating discrimination on a covered ground, in the enjoyment of another 
convention right, constitutes a prima facie Article 14 case, which the state can rebut by 
offering a justification.
41
  The state bears the burden of proving the proportionality of the 
measure under challenge.
42
 
 A prima facie case of Article 14 discrimination first asks whether the alleged 
discrimination affects the equal enjoyment of another Convention right.  This inquiry into 
whether the facts fall within the ‘ambit’ of other Convention articles acts as a substantial 
gatekeeper for discrimination claims, albeit less harshly in Strasbourg than in the UK.
43
  
A second element calls for the case to turn on a covered ground of discrimination.  The 
grounds of discrimination covered by the article are not unlimited, but they appear to 
include any personal characteristic that amounts to a ‘status,’ including those resulting 
from personal choices, like former membership in the KGB, or pursuing a career as a 
lawyer.
44
  A third step, the requirement of less favourable treatment than an analogous 
comparator, is often not mentioned by the ECtHR, and clearly comes into play only when 
required by a case where the true ‘but for’ cause of the differential treatment is difficult to 
identify.
45
  Lord Walker in Carson v Secretary for Work and Pensions quoted the 
observation of van Hoof and van Dijk that the ECtHR tends to ‘gloss over’ the 
comparability test and let cases turn on the final step of justification.
46
   
Since 1968 the justification inquiry has depended on the application of the 
principle of proportionality to each case: distinctions must ‘strike a fair balance between 
the protection of the interests of the community and respect for the rights and freedoms 
safeguarded by the Convention.’47  Thus, whether a case involves a distinction on the 
basis of, for example, sex or property (both specifically listed in Article 14), the 
Strasbourg Court will apply proportionality to determine whether the interference with 
the enjoyment of Convention rights outweighs the state’s need for applying the 
distinction.  Because gender distinctions cause harms to society independent of the 
specific facts of the case, harms such as undermining respect for the law and fostering 
social exclusion, the Court applies proportionality to such distinctions with a substantial 
weight already on the impact side of the scale, before any specific experiences of the 
claimant or her community come into the analysis.  As a result, the state must offer ‘very 
weighty reasons’ to justify a gender classification: this is seldom (but not never) 
possible.
48
  With a distinction on the basis of property, on the other hand, the Court puts 
on the impact side of the balance only what the evidence supports.  This can nevertheless 
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result in a finding of disproportionality: a law that allowed persons above a certain asset 
threshold (a distinction on the ground of property) to purchase extra votes in general 
elections, for example, would impose enough social impacts to outweigh a state interest 
in raising funds.  The point is that in applying Article 14 a court must apply 
proportionality regardless of the ground of differentiation, but will treat discrimination on 
grounds like race, sex, and sexual orientation as having a presumptively weighty 
impact.
49
 
The ECtHR seldom uses the necessity test when applying proportionality in 
Article 14 cases, but the tests of legitimate aim and proportionality stricto sensu were 
incorporated into Article 14 justification in Belgian Linguistics.  The formulation adopted 
there required ‘proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realized.’50  Note that this formulation closely resembles the balancing called for in 
Hampson and Allonby.  It has subsequently been made clear that Article 14 
proportionality requires the rejection of a regulatory distinction that produces ‘harms to 
other legitimate interests’ disproportionate to the degree to which the measure advances a 
legitimate aim.
51
  This means a balancing between ‘public interests’ on one side and 
‘rights interests’ on the other.  Jurisprudence of the ECtHR has identified social inclusion 
and dignity generally, and racial, religious, and gender equality specifically, as common 
‘rights interests’ of the Contracting States of the ECHR.52  Proportionality therefore 
contemplates a situation where the harm of a measure, in terms of the extent of invasion 
of an individual’s rights, or in terms of the damage to common interests in equal dignity 
and social inclusion, could outweigh the benefits of even a measure that was the least 
invasive means of securing a significant state interest.   
The recent Strasbourg opinion in Paulik v Slovakia
53
 shows the proper approach.  
There the petitioner complained of the state’s refusal to revisit a prior judicial 
determination of paternity.  In Slovakia those whose paternity had been declared by 
presumption (based on, for example, marriage to the mother) had access to a procedure to 
challenge the determination through DNA evidence, while those like the claimant, whose 
determination was based on a judicial hearing—before the availability of DNA 
evidence—could not challenge the decision because it was res judicata.  In this case the 
ground of discrimination was the status of having had paternity declared in a judicial 
proceeding.  The state sought to defend its rule on the ground that it was necessary—the 
least restrictive means—to assure legal certainty.  The Court, however, applied 
proportionality, and found that the state’s interest in legal certainty could not outweigh 
the fact that the claimant had no access to a remedy available to others in similar 
situations.  In doing so the Court observed that ‘the “legitimate interest” in ensuring legal 
certainty and the security of family relationships and in protecting the interests of 
children may justify a difference in the treatment of persons with an interest in 
disclaiming paternity,’ but that in this case the kind and extent of difference in treatment 
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was disproportionate to the strength of that interest.
54
  This was true even though the 
means employed by the state appeared to be the only means available (and hence 
obviously the least restrictive) to achieve the legitimate aim.   
Proportionality in Strasbourg weighs as impacts not only the experiences of the 
claimant, but societal costs as well.  In Dudgeon v United Kingdom
55
 the ECtHR found 
unjustified a law in Northern Ireland that outlawed homosexual sex between consenting 
adults.  Although it resolved the claim on Article 8 grounds (the right to respect for 
private life), the Court has made it abundantly clear that it views the application of 
proportionality under Article 8 as equivalent to that under Article 14.
56
 In analysing 
whether the challenged measure satisfied proportionality, the Court noted that no less 
restrictive alternatives existed that would meet the state’s objectives.57  The Court then 
went on to hold that, ‘on the issue of proportionality, the Court considers that such 
justifications as there are for retaining the law in force unamended are outweighed by the 
detrimental effects which the very existence of the legislative provisions in question can 
have on the life of a person of homosexual orientation like the applicant.’58  Earlier in its 
opinion the Court had catalogued these effects and commented on the vast number of 
people affected and the sweeping extent of the effect in terms of the ability of those 
people to act according to their inclinations.  The Court’s analysis considered not only the 
effect of the law on the claimant, but on all homosexuals, and on society as a whole.  
Proportionality in Strasbourg routinely takes into account impacts not only on the 
claimant but on the claimant’s group, upon society, and upon the general interest in non-
discrimination.
59
  Thus there can be no doubt that under Article 14, proportionality means 
that profound effects of discrimination—assessed beyond the experiences of the claimant 
alone—can outweigh the benefits even of a measure that represents the least restrictive 
alternative available to achieve a legitimate aim. By the same token, it means that even 
unnecessarily invasive acts of government can withstand scrutiny if they do not cause 
severe detrimental impacts. 
 
Weighing Impacts and the Inverse Brandeis Brief 
 
Unsurprisingly, despite the similarity between the ECtHR proportionality rubric and that 
resorted to by UK courts to avoid necessity, judges in the UK have not weighed impacts 
any better under the HRA than under statutory anti-discrimination law.  There have been 
several excellent and important UK decisions
60
 under Article 14 (as well as some real 
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stinkers
61
), but none have turned on impacts, as opposed to critical (or not) scrutiny of the 
state’s reasons for its measure.  The House of Lords recently admitted that courts have 
not been handling proportionality correctly, and admonished them to take more notice of 
impacts.   In Huang v Home Secretary
62
 the Lords took an opportunity presented by an 
immigration case to point out a gap in the leading UK formulation of proportionality.  
The pre-HRA case of de Freitas v Secretary of Agriculture
63
 set out a test of 
proportionality that courts have been applying throughout the life of the HRA, and it 
asks, 
 
whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are 
rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom 
are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.
64
  
 
This formulation of course assumes that if means are ‘necessary to accomplish the 
objective,’ then they satisfy proportionality, whatever their effects.  Unfortunately UK 
courts have been citing de Freitas for years without appearing to notice the missing 
reference to, well, proportionality (proportionality stricto sensu).  It seems that under the 
HRA even necessity as a test has become palatable, so long as it allows judges to avoid 
assigning a weight to the impacts of government intrusions on rights.     
When the discrepancy was brought to their attention in Huang, the Lords 
concisely (dismissively?) cleared it up: 
 
This formulation has been widely cited and applied. But counsel for the applicants 
(with the support of Liberty, in a valuable written intervention) suggested that the 
formulation was deficient in omitting reference to an overriding requirement 
which featured in the judgment of Dickson CJ in R v Oakes, from which this 
approach to proportionality derives. This feature is the need to balance the 
interests of society with those of individuals and groups. This is indeed an aspect 
which should never be overlooked or discounted. The House recognised as much 
in R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, when, having 
suggested a series of questions which an adjudicator would have to ask and 
answer in deciding a Convention question, it said that the judgment on 
proportionality: 
"must always involve the striking of a fair balance between the rights of 
the individual and the interests of the community which is inherent in the 
whole of the Convention. The severity and consequences of the 
interference will call for careful assessment at this stage."  
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If, as counsel suggest, insufficient attention has been paid to this requirement, the 
failure should be made good.
65
 
 
As correct as it clearly is, this passage hardly generates optimism, given that it treats the 
absence of an ‘overriding requirement’ of proportionality from a ‘widely cited and 
applied’ test as if it requires nothing more than a quick reminder to the courts not to do it 
again.  The opinion says nothing about how the proper balance should be struck, leaving 
doubt that any great sea change has occurred. 
 The post-HRA context catches the UK judiciary in a revealing paradox.  When 
the ECJ put judges under pressure to scrutinise justifications of indirect discrimination by 
asking whether a less discriminatory alternative existed, they resisted this rule-based 
approach and committed themselves to balancing.  When it becomes clear that the 
ECtHR expects the courts to treat the impact side of the balance as a substantive part of 
the analysis, the courts retreat from ad hoc balancing and hide behind de Freitas-like 
rules.  The circumstances have a single common denominator: UK judges resist robust 
scrutiny of decision makers, whether private employers or the state.   Fortunately for the 
intelligible evolution of proportionality in UK employment discrimination law, the courts 
have, at least in word if not in deed, thrown in their lot with the balancing form of 
proportionality.  This means that the Strasbourg teaching is actually more explanatory of 
and applicable to the proportionality rubric currently intoned by UK judges than is that of 
the ECJ.  If, as I have suggested, the UK courts find their reasoning naturally influenced 
by the ECtHR authorities—or if they are forced to apply them by advocates who bring 
Article 14 to bear on employment discrimination cases through the HRA—justification in 
statutory indirect discrimination cases should turn on impacts as much as on the reasons 
offered by the employer.  Even provisions, criteria, or practices necessary to the 
achievement of legitimate aims should fail the test if the aim is not compelling or the 
impacts imposed are too strongly inconsistent with the aims of anti-discrimination law.  
For proportionality to come fully into its own, courts must be open to having non-
obvious impacts proved to them.  It is my contention that advocates on behalf of 
claimants, and perhaps interveners and amici, such as Liberty or the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, must demand that UK courts and tribunals turn their attention to the 
‘other side of proportionality’ in discrimination cases.  The proportionality rubric gives 
advocates a ground for insisting that a court take into account evidence of impacts.  
Lawyers in the UK must begin to make what I will call an ‘Inverse Brandeis Brief’ a part 
of anti-discrimination litigation.  At least until UK courts become accustomed to 
considering the economic, sociological, psychological and other effects of discriminatory 
laws and policies, advocates must present evidence and research outcomes from these 
fields of study to demonstrate the degree of impact.  Research models exist that could 
substantiate, for example, the claim that collective bargaining that sacrifices the interests 
of victims of discrimination to the interests of the beneficiaries of discrimination, because 
it keeps the union popular with its core members, not only harms the claimants but 
undermines the interests of gender equality in the workplace, contributes to an 
unacceptable breakdown of social inclusion, or even has intolerable economic impacts.  
Courts must be pressured to perform the proportionality analysis the way it reads on the 
tin, and assign a fair weight to the impacts of discriminatory practices. 
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 The concept of the Inverse Brandeis Brief draws, of course, from the famous brief 
filed by Louis Brandeis in the case of Muller v Oregon.
66
  At a time when the US 
Supreme Court was striking down, for example, labour regulation because it constrained 
the freedom of contract, Brandeis’s brief overwhelmed the Court with factual details—
statistics, empirical findings, calculations—that supported the legislature’s decision to 
enact a law limiting working hours.  Brandeis focused on specifically legislative facts—
the fruits of a prospective, general study of the need for such legislation and the 
consequences of failing to act—to make the point that the legislature was better suited to 
gathering such facts, and that the courts had no greater ability to comprehend the 
implications of those facts than the legislature had.  The case proved a turning point in 
the Supreme Court’s attitude of deference to Congress, and to this day the Court routinely 
receives and gives substantial weight to evidence and studies that support challenged 
legislative measures.  
The Inverse Brandeis Brief reverses the original not only by employing empirical 
evidence to weigh against challenged legislation, but by emphasising judicial facts to 
assist in making a decision for which a court offers the most suitable institutional 
structure and position.  ‘Judicial facts’ refers to retrospective facts—those which relate to 
what has actually happened or what is now clearly likely to happen—received in a forum 
where both sides of the debate have an equal procedural standing, regardless of the 
number of people that support each side.  Judicial facts need not, however, relate 
exclusively to the individual complainant or to a specific group of complainants.  It is 
true that at first, when a court faces the question whether a claimant has suffered prima 
facie Article 14 discrimination, or statutory indirect discrimination, it should consider 
only the facts germane to the claimant’s situation.  However, once prima facie 
discrimination has been found, and the state or the employer claims that its 
discriminatory measure satisfies a justification defence, the question shifts to 
proportionality: did the decision-maker, in adopting the challenged measure to meet a 
stated objective, act proportionately?  The burden of this inquiry rests on the state or the 
employer, and the answer depends upon whether the measure produces harms to equality 
interests disproportionate to the degree to which it advances a legitimate aim.
67
  Nothing 
requires or even supports restricting these equality interests to those of the claimant or 
claimants.  Whether a policy or law is ‘proportionate’ depends on the policy’s benefits 
compared to the policy’s impacts, not merely to those impacts that happened to be felt by 
the claimant.  Ample precedent exists in which UK courts receive and consider evidence 
of the wider impacts of regulatory schemes,
68
 and some have assumed that ECHR cases 
would require this kind of evidence.
69
 
It might be argued that this logic gets less of a purchase on statutory employment 
discrimination claims because they typically do not involve the state, and its engagement 
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with larger societal interests.  Such an argument would be misconceived: statutory anti-
discrimination laws represent a public policy decision that, in most cases, the interests of 
individual businesses, and of economic efficiency generally, must yield to the higher 
societal priority placed on preventing unequal treatment.  When an employer pleads a 
justification defence or a GOR, the employer claims that it policy is not the kind of 
situation the statutes seek to prevent.  Proportionality does the job of sorting acceptable 
situations from unacceptable ones.  If the impact is proportionate, the measure is by 
definition not the kind on whose prevention society has placed an overriding priority.  
Why should this determination not involve consideration of whether this rule or practice, 
which the employer claims should receive exceptional treatment, brings about the kinds 
of effects that the statutes seek to eliminate or minimise?  Taking account of the aims 
behind anti-discrimination laws emanating from the EC and domestically, these effects 
include breakdowns in social inclusion, economic harm from failure to reward merit, 
racial tension, strains on health and family life, and so on.  No possible principle, other 
than a desire to save judges the work involved, can explain why an employer seeking to 
use a rule that imposes an indirectly discriminatory impact should not have his or her 
need for the rule weighed against its social and economic impacts.  Courts in the UK 
applying proportionality should consider evidence relating to societal impacts of 
challenged measures, just as the ECtHR does. 
Although producing a proper blueprint for an Inverse Brandeis Brief will require 
another paper, some obvious candidates for inclusion present themselves.  An Inverse 
Brandeis Brief should include evidence of the economic and psychological impacts of 
discrimination, such as imposition of a ‘racial tax.’70  Ample evidence exists that people 
subject to discrimination or similar kinds of unfairness suffer stress-related health 
problems that impose a societal cost which must be weighed against the benefits of the 
policy in question.
71
  Sociological literature offers boundless support for the claim that 
notorious discrimination and targeting harms the ability of insular minorities to 
participate economically, and thus undermines social inclusion.  All of this information 
must be presented to the court, which can then give it a weight commensurate with the 
weight courts have traditionally given to similar kinds of evidence offered in support of 
challenged state measures.   
I anticipate at least four objections to this kind of approach: (1) it will make the 
amount of evidence courts must consider overwhelming, (2) the UK should wait for 
Strasbourg to tell it to accept more impact evidence, (3) it is inappropriate for judges to 
second-guess business decision-makers, and (4) this approach allows judges to make too 
many value judgments.  I will address these in turn.  First, relevance as a threshold 
requirement for the admission of evidence has always been the primary means of 
preventing a deluge of unnecessary information.  If a report on the health impacts of 
discrimination is relevant to deciding whether a particular employment policy imposes 
more burdens than are justified by its effectiveness, then it should be admitted, no matter 
how inconvenient that might be for the employer or for the court.  It is simply not a 
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sustainable argument to suggest that relevant evidence should be excluded merely 
because it is inconvenient. 
Second, Strasbourg has had little opportunity to set any precedent for how 
domestic courts should apply proportionality because of the very distinct roles of the 
ECtHR and domestic courts.  The role of the ECtHR is to supervise the extent to which 
signatory states comply with their treaty obligations.  An underlying principle of the 
ECHR is that Strasbourg determines the standard to which human rights must be 
protected, but the Contracting Parties decide how to deliver this level of protection.  In 
other words, the mode of protection of Convention rights is not expected to be the same 
throughout Europe.  From this principle has emerged the doctrine of ‘the margin of 
appreciation,’ which refers to an area within which Strasbourg defers to the prerogative 
of the signatory state to strike its own characteristic balance when human rights must give 
way to overriding state interests.   
This does not mean that the ECtHR does not impose limits, it simply means that 
states are allowed to reach different outcomes when applying proportionality, as long as 
the outcomes are not outside the margin of appreciation.
72
  As a result, the Strasbourg 
Court does not really ‘do’ proportionality beyond what is necessary to determine whether 
the balance struck by the signatory state exceeds the margin of appreciation.  In doing so 
the Court has definitely cited broader societal impacts as grounds for finding challenged 
discrimination disproportionate.
73
  The only part of this Inverse Brandeis Brief proposal 
on which the ECtHR has not provided authority is the acceptability to the courts of social 
sciences evidence in connection with the weighing of impacts.  The actual mechanics of 
proportionality, however, have always been for the Contracting Parties to sort out, and it 
is for the state to decide whether the legislature, the judiciary, the executive, or some 
combination thereof, ultimately strikes the balance.
74
 As discussed above, the HRA has 
placed the courts in the institutional position of being the final arbiters of compatibility 
with ECHR rights, and has given them powers and responsibilities which leave them no 
choice but to make—in cases where this is relevant—independent assessments of the  
proportionality of challenged measures.  Therefore, nothing stands in the way of UK 
courts paying increasing attention to weighing the impacts of discrimination in a 
proportionality analysis, and accepting social sciences and health evidence in aid of 
assigning a proper weight. 
 Third, courts and tribunals should defer to employer expertise as to what is in the 
interests of the business or, to an extent, what is necessary for the achievement of a 
business objective.  However, courts are much better placed than employers to evaluate 
the effects of discrimination.  They are institutionally suited to the retrospective fact 
finding necessary to determine the actual impacts of measures.
75
  Also, it is simply 
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inconsistent with the very concept of preventing discrimination to suggest that an 
admittedly self-interested business decision made by an employer has more legitimacy 
than the same decision scrutinised in a forum where there are two parties of equal 
importance, given equal opportunity to speak and present evidence, and in which 
decisions are premised on reasoned argument rather than profit motive.  Finally, it must 
be remembered that justification is a defence.  The employer wants to use a criterion or 
practice which imposes disparate impacts.  It has placed the matter in controversy by 
invoking the defence, and must submit to scrutiny of the extent to which the proposed 
rule comports with society’s anti-discrimination policies.  If employers (or unions) are 
left in some uncertainty as to whether a policy they propose to implement is 
proportionate, it is hard to feel sorry for them.  This approach would send out the 
message that indirectly discriminatory policies should be avoided unless the employer 
has investigated the impacts and kept them moderate, or has a truly compelling need for 
the policy. 
 Fourth, candid engagement in ad hoc balancing does not restrain judges any less 
than rule-like approaches: it simply makes the process transparent.  As we have seen, 
distrust of proportionality, among U.K. judges, has led them either to suppress the 
ultimate proportionality balancing or to adopt rule-like tests such as those in Crizzle or de 
Freitas.  However, these tests depend on covert balancing.  Deciding what constitutes a 
legitimate aim requires balancing: GMB v Allen might have come out differently in the 
EAT had the tribunal put a lower weight on the union’s ‘legitimate’ objective in 
sacrificing the interests of a minority of members to those of itself and its core members.  
Any time a court concludes that despite the discriminatory effects that result from it, a 
particular policy is sufficiently reasonable to render it justified (see Crizzle), it has used 
balancing to make a value judgment about what kinds of conduct run afoul of 
antidiscrimination laws.  Accepting and weighing evidence on impacts does not make 
judicial decision making any more unfettered, it simply makes judges explain the 
balancing they are engaging in already, and makes it more likely that they will strike the 
balance in an informed way. 
 
V. Conclusion 
  
UK courts and tribunals, applying the justification defence in statutory indirect 
discrimination claims, have long interpreted proportionality in a way distinct from that 
prescribed by the ECJ.  Initially, the UK judiciary turned to balancing in order to avoid 
exposing employers to the harsh scrutiny represented by the ECJ requirement that 
indirectly discriminatory rules be ‘necessary’ to meet a ‘real need’ of the business.  This 
balancing form of proportionality, which weighs the needs of the business against the 
effects of the indirectly discriminatory measure, closely resembles the proportionality 
rubric at the heart of the Strasbourg analysis of Article 14 ECHR.  In light of this affinity, 
as well as the HRA’s requirement that, in cases where Article 14 applies, domestic 
statutes be read consistently with the Convention right, the ECtHR jurisprudence on 
proportionality seems to be a natural source guidance for UK judges applying the 
justification defence.  However, just as they shied away from ‘necessity’ because of the 
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intensity with which it required them to scrutinise employer’s decisions, they resist the 
Strasbourg approach to proportionality as well.  The ECtHR teaching on Article 14 calls 
for courts to receive evidence on and assign a weight to the impacts of discriminatory 
policies, and to allow for the possibility that the impacts could outweigh even a measure 
necessary to meet the employer’s aim.  The UK judiciary has yet to make this possibility 
real.  For the justification defence in the UK to represent any kind of obstacle to indirect 
discrimination, it must incorporate the Strasbourg approach to proportionality, and 
carefully weigh the impacts of challenged measures.  To that end, advocates, amici, and 
public interest interveners must offer evidence—reports from the social sciences, 
economic studies, and even research from the health fields—of the impacts of 
discrimination, and demand that the tribunals receive and consider them.      
